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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR NEW HOUSING -
REASONABLE AND PROPORTIONAL PROPERTY TAXES
Judicial decision has eliminated the latest Massachusetts
housing plan. Senate document 57 would enable the cities of
the Commonwealth to exempt from property tax for five years
all residential buildings, except hotels, constructed within one
year after enactment of said document into law. House docu-
ment 1478 would permit the cities to exempt from taxation
for five years all housing constructed within five years after
enactment for sale to veterans of World War II. Land proper
is not involved in either bill. By Massachusetts' method of
legislative reference to the Supreme Judicial Court for con-
stitutional determination of proposed new law, the justices
advised that no "compelling reasons" were found to bring what
in substance had been a key gubernatorial campaign promise
within the description of legally allowable exemptions. The
avowed purposes of the acts was simply to ease the housing
shortage. Opinion of the Justices.'
It is altogether fitting that Massachusetts should be the test-
ing ground for this controversial legislation as the state has a
lengthy and interesting history in the housing field.2 In 1912
the Massachusetts supreme court, sitting at one of the earliest
judicial considerations of the general subject, negatived the
use of state funds to sell houses at cost to low income groups
since this was thought not primarily a promotion of the public
interest.3 Though it was from no lack of local interest, not
1. 85 N.E.2d (Mass. 1949).
2. See Robinson and Robinson, State Aid for Housing, [1949 Wis. L.
REv. 462 and State Spending for Veteran's Housing, Id. at 10, John I. Rob-
inson, Public Housing in Massachusttts, 18 B. U. L. REV. 83 (1938).
3. Opinion of the Justices, 211 Mass. 624, 98 N.E. 611 (1912). Prob-
ably every litigant seeking to overturn a housing authority act has cited
this interesting case. As recently as 1938, at least one authoritative source
felt that the shade of this opinion had not yet been laid to rest despite
constitutional amendment (see note 5, infra) designed to effectuate that
result. John I. Robinson, supra note 2.
This early legislative proposal was discussed at length by a Missouri
court: "The act ... sought to provide homes for all persons regardless
of size of income; it made no declaration of urgent necessity, it did not
find the existence of conditions inimical to the public health, safety, morals,
and welfare and declare that private industry had failed to relieve such
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until twenty-seven years later in Atlydonn Realty Corp. v.
Holyoke Housing Authority4 was the first real housing law
successfully litigated in the state. Disregarded were two
amendments' designed to legalize governmental spending for
construction of private dwellings, the case holding in com-
parison to the 1912 opinion that certain types of housing legis-
lation came within the "public purpose" requirements of the
constitution. The Allydonn decision involved the constitution-
ality of an early housing authority, that is, one of the presently
common municipal corporations created to act upon the more
serious metropolitan housing problems with planned demolition
and construction.' Massachusetts now has numerous authorities
using state and federal funds.8 Various types of these organ-
conditions; it did not invoke the police power in clearing of slum districts
and the building of sanitary dwellings." Laret Investment Co. v. Dick-
mann, Mayor, 345 Mo. 449, 456, 134 S.W.2d 65, 69 (1939). This case went
ahead to uphold housing legislation in Missouri of the type mentioned in
note 7 infra. Note the currency of these criticism in regard to the subject
matter of this case comment.
As to the "public interest" concept, see note 6 infra.
4. 304. Mass. 288, 23 N.E.2d 665 (1939).
5. MAss. CONST. AMEND. 43 and 47. The former provides: the common-
wealth may buy land and build upon it houses to be sold to the populace,
these houses not to be saleable at less than cost; the latter: during war
or exigency, the supply of food, other necessities, and shelter are public
functions and legislation may allow the state and its cities to provide them.
6. Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority, 304 Mass. 288,
295, 23 N.E.2d 665, 669 (1939). As to what should be considered in the
search for a public purpose see Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke, supra Id.
at 293, 23 N.E.2d at 667.
There is no single constitutional expressioU of need for a public purpose
in the expenditure of state money. "It is expressed in various forms.
In Art. XI of c. 2, § 1, by restricting the issuing of moneys from the
treasury to purposes of 'the necessary defence and support of the Com-
monwealth; and for the protection and preservation of the inhabitants
thereof, agreeably to the acts and resolves of the General Court [i.e., the
state legislature].' In Art. IV of c. 1, § 1, by declaring the purposes, for
which the power of taxation, in its various forms, may be exercised by the
General Court, to be 'for the public service, in the necessary defence and
support of the government of the said Commonwealth, and the protection
and preservation of the subjects thereof.' The purport and scope of these
provisions are made more distinct ... by reference to . . . Art. X [MASS.
CONST. Art. X, pt. 1-this first half of the constitution is called the Dec-
laration of Rights] . . ." Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454, 461 (1873).
7. The promise of federal aid has played the largest part in stimulat-
ing the creation of these housing authorities. Forty or more states have
taken advantage of this aid, originally proffered in 42 U.S.C.A. 1410 (U.S.
Housing Act of 1937), at least to the extent of passing certain congres-
sionally required measures-of which tax exemption of the authorities
themselves is the main one. These requirements do not involve the put-
ting up of any local money at all.
8. Note the distinction between housing authorities financed by the Fed-
eral Government and the much rarer state-financed authorities. The fed-
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izations are found in most jurisdictions today, and despite the
considerable litigation encountered there seems little doubt as
to their judicial acceptability.9
The Massachusetts veteran has been favored recently to the
extent of a $200,000,000 housing authority for his exclusive
benefit. 10 The court based the validity of this project on the
settled bonus principle of reasonable benefits due and owing
to ex-military personnel, thus avoiding any constitutional prob-
lems previously found in connection with housing authority
legislation." Other states have willingly affirmed aid for
veterans through schemes for temporary housing (thereby
evading the stigma of socialization)," but thus far in addition
to Massachusetts only a handful of states have provided any
real program for construction of permanent units.13
With only the briefest review of the precedents, it is easy
to understand why the commonwealth has been regarded as
having the most extensive and well-balanced public housing aid
in the nation. This considered, there can be little explanation
of the negative result in Opinion of the Justices14 not covered
eral method of aid seems the more effective and is copied frequently by
those states with locally funded authorities. For direct assistance the
former provides annual subsidies to the authority; for indirect aid, guar-
anty of housing authority notes and bonds. Robinson and Robinson, State
Aid for Housing, [1949] WIS. L. RnV. 462. Of course if the state itself
is willing to supply funds, this action may be taken in concert with federal
appropriation as in Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority,
304 Mass. 288, 23 N.E.2d 665 (1939).
9. This is the conclusion of Robinson and Robinson, State Spending for
Veterans' Housing, [1949] Wis. L. REv. 10, at 18. Perhaps virtually com-
plete acceptability is found only in regard to authorities using no state
supplied funds at all; see note 7 and 8 supra. At any rate the difficulties
of the Massachusetts tax exemption bills are only a sample of the divers
types of opposition which the housing authorities have faced and continue
to face. For instance, Ohio has denied tax exemption to the authorities
because they do not belong exclusively to the state, Columbus Metropolitan
Housing Authority v. Thatcher, 140 Ohio 38, 42 N.E.2d 437 (1942); in
Maryland only certain taxes are relieved, Pittman v. Housing Authority
of Baltimore, 180 Md. 457, 25 A.2d 466 (1942); Wisconsin allows the use
of state funds only for housing veterans, (and this but very recently) Wis.
CONST. Art. VIII, § 10.
10. Opinion of the Justices, 322 Mass. 745, 78 N.E.2d 197 (1948).
11. See Robinson and Robinson, State Spending for Veteran's Housing,
[1949] Wis. L. REv. 10, at 20.
12. Griffith v. Los Angeles, 78 Cal.2d 796, 178 P.2d 793 (1947); Hyland
v. City of Eugene, 179 Ore. 567, 173 P.2d 464 (1946); City of Columbus
v. Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority, 33 Ohio 0. 212, 67 N.E.2d
338 (1946).
13. Robinson and Robinson, State Spending for Veteran's Housing,
[1949] Wis. L. Rnv. 10, at 14.
14. 85 N.E.2d (Mass. 1949).
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by its text. The opinion finds two constitutional provisions
jeopardized by the proposed tax exemption-MASS. CONST. Art.
X, pt. I and Art. IV, §1, c. 1., pt. II. These read, respectively:
"Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by
it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according
to standing laws . . ." and "[The legislature has the power
and authority to] impose and levy proportional and reasonable
assements, rates, and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and
persons resident, and estates lying, within the said common-
wealth . . ." Probably owing to its more immediate applica-
bility, the latter stipulation is of the two the most discussed in
the holding. In essence, this holding is, that the state's relief
of certain realty from levy, while not so relieving other realty
in the same category, gives rise to disproportional taxation and
is therefore unconstitutional. The court enlarges on this to
say that while the framers of the proposed bills may not have
intended to incorporate into them any concept of dispropor-
tionate taxation, the fact is that every tax exemption must
always be in derogation of the "proportional" requirement 15 of
the constitution."6
However, exemptions are germane to any discussion of tax-
ation and assuredly may be created, if only to a limited extent.
In point of fact a number of exemptions presently exist by
statute in Massachusetts.1 7  Despite the justices' distaste for
them, they explain the past creation of exemptions on the theory
that the general principles set down in the constitution cannot
be applied with literal exactness. 18 Further, an earlier Opinion
15. MASS. CONST. Art. IV, § 1, pt. II. This provision for "proportion"
in direct taxes has as its raison d'etre the fact that as all property must
be taxed to defray the expense of government, taxes should be based on
benefit derived from the government in its protection of said property. In-
asmuch as the amount held under this state-sanctioned ownership ought to
determine the share which the proprietor owes to the community, he should
be levied upon accordingly. Oliver v. Washington Mills, 93 Mass. (11
Allen) 268, 275 (1865).
The Massachusetts constitution allows excise taxes to be dispropor-
tional; they need be reasonable only. However, in regard to our purposes:
"The mere right to own and hold property ... cannot be made the sub-
ject of excise tax." Opinion of the Justices, 195 Mass. 607, 614, 84 N.E.
499, 503 (1908).
16. 85 N.E.2d 222, 226 (Mass. 1949).
17. The Massachusetts tax exemptions are codified under MASS. LAWS
ANN., c. 59, § 5. There are some 35 clauses to this section, most of which
have undergone considerable amendment.
18. 85 N.E.2d 222, 226 (Mass. 1949), the court adding that, "Some
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss2/7
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of the Justices is cited to the effect that it is the duty of the
legislature to avoid only insofar as possible any tax mechanism
which has a "direct tendency" to create disproportion in its
assessments. 9 To these general statements of policy, the 1949
Supreme Judicial Court makes a significant addition. It holds
that exemptions-though in fundamental conflict with the con-
stitution-may be allowed where sufficient "compelling reasons"
exist.20 To the misfortune of the instant tax exemption plan,
the court fails to find justification for them by way of any
"compelling reasons." It is apparent that they felt the benefit
to be anticipated was not in the least commensurate with the
risk of constitutional perversion involved. The justices further
fail to find any distinction in the vital lack of "compelling
reasons" between this legislation and that which was struck
down2 in Inhabitants of Cheshire v. County Commissioners of
Berkshire.3 The law involved in the latter case allowed reser-
voirs, dams, and the land under these to be assessed according
to the worth of similar land in the vicinity not so improved.
It was held that this resulted in an unconstitutional dispropor-
tion in local property taxes. That early decision did not speak
of exemptions as such, although the law under attack was,
similarly to our 1949 house and senate documents, for the en-
couragement of a particular type of construction. Apparently
any number of illegal devices will create disproportion in the
direct taxing of property, and the Massachusetts courts will
not hesitate to seek them out. 3
How do the bills in question compare with existing exemption
statutes, all of which are presumably based on "compelling
reasons"? There are in Massachusetts four broad classifications
exemptions . . . are permissible" when they do not impair the force of
the constitution itself.
19. Opinion of the Justices, 195 Mass. 607, 609, 84 N.E. 499, 502 (1908).
20. 85 N.E.2d 222, 226 (Mass. 1949).
21. Mass. Stat. 1872, c. 306.
22. 118 Mass. 386, 389 (1875): "That provision [MAss. CONST. Art. IV,
§ 1, c. 1, pt. I] requires that all taxes levied under its authority be 'pro-
portional and reasonable', and forbids their imposition upon one class of
persons or property at a different rate from that which is applied to
other classes. .. ."
23. E.g., Inhabitants of Cheshire v. County Commissioner of Berkshire,
118 Mass. 386 (1875); Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth,
133 Mass. 161 (1882); S. S. White Dental Mfg. Co. v. Commonwealth, 212
Mass. 35, 98 N.E. 1056 (1912); Perkins v. Inhabitants of Westwood, 226
Mass. 268, 115 N.E. 411 (1917); Animal Rescue League of Boston v.
Assessors of Bourne, 310 Mass. 330, 37 N.E.2d 1019 (1941).
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to which these statutes apply: (1) public and charitable prop-
erty, and property which tends to relieve the public burden-
apparently included here are the veterans' associations, pension
plan organizations, and the housing authorities; (2) articles of
personal use-furniture and wearing apparel; (3) in closely
limited amounts, property of the hardship case-construed as
the very poor, handicapped veterans, dependents of deceased vet-
erans; (4) that property which is necessary to reduce or elimi-
nate double taxation.-4 As municipal corporations, the housing
authorities themselves are tax exempt under the first classifica-
tion.- However, private builders functioning without state
funds or supervision clearly cannot be exempted through the
same reasoning, nor can they be considered as having in the
alternative any "charitable" qualities or as in sufficient relief
of the "public burden." The second and fourth classifications
are obviously inapplicable. Some argument could be made as
to the proposed laws' constitutionality under number three
owing to the great distress in the cities from poor housing
conditions. However, it is felt that this argument must fail
because the exemption obtainable is limited only by the finances
of the builder, and by no means are hardship cases alone
specified. Although they chose not to, the justices might have
ignored precedent and created a fifth classification to cover the
bills in question. This would have been the factual result of
an affirmative answer to the legislators, whether the court
specifically call it another classification or not.
There is a Massachusetts statute, one more or less common
to a number of states, exempting any property of certain
classes of veterans and their dependents from $1,000 of assessed
value. 6 This particular exemption is cited by the court, T but
24. 85 N.E.2d 222, 226 (Mass. 1949). The most questionable exemp-
tions appear to be those which are hopefully tucked in under the concept
laid down in Opinion of the Justices, 270 Mass. 593, 595, 170 N.E. 800,
802 (1930): "Exemption from taxation on ground of lack of ability to
pay was recognized to a limited extent even as against the constitutional
requirement that property taxes must be proportional. .... ." Note that if
persons who have been relieved for poverty die with more than a certain
sum, the state attaches what was not taken before. MASS. LAWS ANN.
c. 59, § 5A.
25. Presumably if the Massachusetts documents in question were in ef-
fect, their benefits would inure to the units constructed under the direction
of any of the housing authorities. See [1950] WASH. U. L. Q. 139 as to
the status under the 14th Amendment of one type of housing corporation
nevertheless tax exempt as engaged in a public purpose.
26. MAsS. LAWS ANN. c. 59. § 5, cl. 23.
27. 85 N.E.2d 222, 228 (Mass. 1949)
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apparently its legality has never been the subject of litigation
even though passed in original form over fifty years ago. It
may be one of the exemptions the legality of which the court
obliquely refuses to determine. 8 It is probable that this $1,000
relief is valid under "classification three" of Massachusetts'
exemptions (see p. 267 supra). By the same token and despite
the lack of powerful sanction stemming from half a century's
acquiescence, a closely restricted tax exemption (which the house
and senate documents are not) on new housing conceivably
would be susceptible of a favorable reception by the Massa-
chusetts court.
Perhaps such a reception would be received by an exemption
which determined the amount to be spent and effectively
limited the recipients to those in special need. A strong argu-
ment for this type of exemption is that in final result there
would be no perceptible disparity with the achievements of
housing authorities. Or the exemption concept could be elim-
inated entirely. For instance, if the house document now ap-
plying to housing "constructed for sale to a veteran of World
War II"''2 made certain that the beneficiaries were to be vet-
erans actually buying and living in the new houses, a bonus
theory could be invoked to save it (see p. 264 supra).3o
In their present form we cannot argue with conviction the
legality of the rejected exemptions. There is little to be noted
in their favor that is unique in housing acts other than a
potential simplicity of administration and retention of private
initiative by the house-owner. To the greatest extent private
contractors and promoters would be benefited and, practically
considered, with the building industry going at near capacity
what purpose is served by indiscriminately bidding up the
28. 85 N.E.2d 222, 227 (Mass. 1949). Elsewhere it has been said of the
exemption granted in the MAss. LAWS ANN. C, 59, § 5 that while some of
them are constitutional, of others this "has not been affirmed, and may bequestionable." Opinion of the Justices, 195 Mass. 607, 612, 84 N.E. 499,
502 (1908). Thus, for a long time the status of these exemptions has
been indefinite. Has no taxpayer ever complained?
It was suggested in Opinion of the Justices, 270 Mass. 593, 596, 170
N.E. 800, 803 (1903) that the passage of time lends an affirmative qual-
ity to the validity of these exemptions.
29. 85 N.E.2d 222, 228 (Mass. 1949).
30. However, the court points out that "the Constitution . . . contains
no exemptions in favor of veterans." Ibid. Doubtless the framers of the
house document were counting on a certain judicial lenience in regard
to veterans.
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services of these entrepreneurs? Doubtless the court is not
inconsiderate of unattractive ancillary aspects to the proposed
laws, its attitude being at least the more definite as a con-
sequence. Thus, for the people of Massachusetts to ease the
housing shortage by encouraging new building and/or to aid
the veteran-it being impossible to determine definitely which,
if either, is the primary intent-in the exact manner proposed,
leaves them as their first task the formation of a new article
of amendment to the constitution as were their predecessors
forced to do in a like situation nearly forty years ago.3 1
DIXON F. SPIvi
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PARI-MUTUEL BETTING UNDER
STATE ANTI-LOTTERY PROVISIONS
In the recent case of Longstreth v. Cook,' the Supreme Court
of Arkansas, in a divided opinion, held that a statute legalizing
pari-mutuel betting on horse races does not violate the following
provision of the Arkansas Constitution: "No lottery shall be
authorized by this state, nor shall the sale of lottery tickets be
allowed.
'2
That the pari-mutuel system of betting on horse races consti-
tutes gambling cannot be questioned. The issue involved in the
Longstreth case, however, is whether it constitutes that form
of gambling known as a lottery. The latter is defined as:
A scheme for the distribution of prizes by lot or chance;
especially, a scheme by which one or more prizes are dis-
tributed by chance among persons who have paid or
promised a consideration for a chance to win them, usually
as determined by the numbers on tickets as drawn from
a lottery wheel.3
A lottery consists of three essential elements: prize, con-
sideration, and chance. 4 Unquestionably, the first two elements
are present in wagering on horse races. It is the last of these
requisites, chance, which controls the determination of the issue
31. Following Opinion of the Justices, 211 Mass. 624, 98 N.E. 611 (1912)
there proceeded certain amendments to the constitution to allow that which
had been declared void. See note 3 supra.
1. 220 SW.2d 433 (Ark. 1949).
2. ARK. CONST. Art. XIX, § 14.
3. WBqTR' NFIV INT'L DICTIONARY 1461 (2d ed. 1945).
4. 34 C. J. LOTTERIES, § 3, p. 649; 54 C. J. LOTTERIES, § 2, p. 845.
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